
































































Here See Any Levers?
William Watson
If you give a man a ﬁsh, you feed him for a
day. If you teach a man to ﬁsh, he’ll destroy
the cod stock.
Old policy saying 
INTRODUCTION
T
he topic I have been assigned is “social
policy and productivity.” After a
detour that takes on the prior task of
trying to establish the usefulness of produc-
tivity growth, the conclusion I draw is that
the connections between social policy and
productivity are not yet (and may never be)
clear enough to provide policy-ready esti-
mates of the payoffs from the many different
social policies that today are often thought to
encourage productivity growth. For the time
being, therefore, it may be better to base
decisions about social policy on considera-
tions other than its presumed ability to boost
economic performance. Such a conclusion
may disappoint those who see growth effects
as a persuasive new rationale for greater
spending on social policy, but even in a post-
Reagan, post-Thatcher era, older rationales
having to do with fairness and equality still
have political and intellectual purchase, even
if they may not justify spending at the levels
to which we have become accustomed in the
last few decades.
PRODUCTIVITY DEFINED
Most Canadians think about produc-
tivity the way most children think about
spinach: they have often been told that it will
be good for them in the long run but they
suspect it’s not going to be fun. When it’s
their employers asking them to increase their
productivity, they generally assume that
means they’re going to have to work harder.
When it’s the government asking them, they
probably have little idea of what’s intended
— and neither, in fairness, may the govern-
ment. In fact, most Canadians apparently don’t
spend much time thinking about productivi-
ty: a Pollara poll taken in 1998 revealed that
only 21 percent of respondents felt they had a
good understanding of what the word meant.
(This is only slightly less than the number —
36 percent — who were able to correctly
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those with university degrees, 37 percent felt
they understood the productivity issue,
though among those with a high school edu-
cation or less only 14 percent did. Pollara’s
president, Michael Marzolini, said, “A 14
percent awareness level is the lowest that I
have ever seen for an issue this important, an
issue being called a national priority”
(Marzolini 1999). It was because of poll
numbers like these, presumably, that the fed-
eral government reportedly abandoned the
idea of a productivity budget.
1
The gut feeling of many Canadians
that raising their productivity is going to
require them to work harder is only partly
correct. Improving effort per worker hour is
one way to increase output per worker hour (a
standard deﬁnition of productivity). But in fact
economists usually focus on other methods,
such as giving workers more and/or better cap-
ital to work with, or making workers them-
selves “better” by increasing their “human
capital” (economists’ jargon for knowledge,
skills and experience). Finally, there’s also the
possibility of increasing the efficiency with
which all these “factors of production” are com-
bined, so that more output can be produced
with a given set of inputs. If, for instance, a
ﬁrm can ﬁgure out how to get people to
move around the factory ﬂoor without bump-
ing into each other so much, things will run
more smoothly and more output will be pro-
duced without anyone in particular working
harder.
Increasing productivity without increas-
ing the number or quality of inputs used
sounds dangerously like the free lunch econo-
mists are not supposed to believe in. In the
real world, ﬁguring out how to use existing
resources more efficiently probably takes
money: you may have to hire time-and-motion
experts, or spend paid downtime with your
employees, who are often their own best time-
and-motion experts, asking them how a given
set of tasks could be done smarter. Raising
productivity in this way is therefore an
investment. Effort and expense are incurred
now in anticipation of a reward later — a
reward measured in terms of reduced effort
and expense for a given output, or increased
output for given effort and expense. The other
obvious way of increasing productivity — by
making machines and/or workers smarter —
also involves investment: it takes time, effort
and expense to ﬁgure out how to do that; new
machines have to be designed and developed
and workers have to be trained in how to use
them. And even if it’s just a question of increas-
ing the number of old-style machines that
workers work with, buying more machines
costs money.
HOW POLICY FITS IN
Casting the productivity problem in
these terms allows us to borrow some tried-
and-true rules from investment theory. For
example, if an investment in increased pro-
ductivity is to make sense economically, its
cost should be less than its beneﬁt. That may
sound obvious, but in some circles “produc-
tivity” is a motherhood phenomenon: you sup-
posedly can’t have too much of it. On the
contrary, a basic rule of economics is that you
can have too much of a good thing. If the effort
required to increase productivity is greater
than the value of the extra output gained, then
the game isn’t worth the candle, and society
should do without the extra productivity. The
American cartoonist Rube Goldberg made a
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that accomplished trivial tasks. Society
wouldn’t want the Rube Goldberg version of
a productivity agenda: a massive investment
that brings forth only trivial returns. In theo-
ry, at least, there may be better places to put
the money.
An obvious investment strategy is
therefore to go for the productivity improve-
ments whose beneﬁts most exceed their costs
and to stop when the rate of return of the next
investment considered is less than the going rate
of interest. Going beyond that and investing in
any project that cannot pay back the money it
requires is a misallocation of resources. The
advantage of a market economy is that lots of
people throughout society will have every
incentive to follow this strategy in pursuing
productivity investments, the reason being
that they stand to proﬁt — either ﬁnancially
or otherwise — by doing so. Workers can
increase their productivity, and therefore their
wages, by investing in their own human cap-
ital. Firms can cut their costs or increase their
revenues by investing in physical capital.
Researchers can make money inventing new
intellectual capital. And so on. From this per-
spective, the role of the policy-maker is sec-
ondary: to seek out high-return investments
in productivity that, because of one form or
another of “market failure,” are not being
undertaken. Are workers unable to ﬁnd
ﬁnancing for their educational self-improve-
ment because the capital market won’t lend
them money they would have every likeli-
hood of being able to pay back if only they
could get the education? Are researchers
unable to appropriate the beneﬁts of their
research — and are they therefore discouraged
from undertaking it — because new ideas are
easily commandeered by competitors? Are
ﬁrms not investing in enough machinery or
equipment because tax policy has been
designed with insufficient attention to its
effects on the incentive to make such produc-
tivity-raising acquisitions?
Stated this way, the job of the policy-
maker is simple: look around the society, can-
vass all the possible productivity-improving
investments, and use taxes, subsidies and any
other policy instruments you can think of to
encourage those that aren’t being done. Of
course, lots of apparently simple things are
hard to do well. High jumping, for instance.
What could be simpler? “Jump high!” But
very few people excel at it. Designing policies,
in this case social policies, to improve produc-
tivity is similarly difficult. The main problem
is that costs and beneﬁts do not reveal them-
selves spontaneously. And in those cases where
“externalities” or “non-pecuniary beneﬁts” are
involved, they may not reveal themselves at all.
THE VALUE OF “OUTPUT,” THE
MEANING OF “EFFICIENCY”
Before going on to consider the
assigned topic — the relationship between
social policy and productivity — it may be
useful to consider an objection to this over-
all framework that has been raised by Joseph
Heath, both in his contribution to this vol-
ume and in his remarkable book The Efficient
Society: Why Canada Is as Close to Utopia as It
Gets (Heath 2001).
Heath’s main objection, to paraphrase
very baldly, is that productivity increases
may not have the payoff we seem to expect
from them. He is, of course, at least partly
right. As already argued, even in traditional
economics productivity isn’t everything. The
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well turn out to be wasteful: they may not
offer, even ex ante, beneﬁts greater than their
costs. But Heath argues, more provocatively,
that some improvements that do pass the
economist’s customary cost-beneﬁt test may
not be worthwhile from a broader perspec-
tive. In particular, he complains that produc-
tivity growth has not (1) brought increased
leisure, as was widely expected; (2) increased
consumer satisfaction; (3) eliminated poverty;
or (4) decreased social inequality. I want to
consider each of these points very brieﬂy and
in reverse order.
Inequality
Why increasing productivity, all on its
own, should be expected to reduce social
inequality is not immediately obvious. If pro-
ductivity gains were systematically greater
among society’s least productive members
than among its most productive, then pro-
ductivity growth would reduce social inequal-
ity. The well-known “convergence hypothesis”
holds that this is exactly what happens among
nations: growth rates do tend to be higher in
countries that start out behind. But there is
no obvious reason to presume it should also
happen among individuals. And if the ability
to become more productive really is greater
among those who already have acquired
human capital, as both the conceit of academ-
ics and the folklore of the new economy sug-
gest, then productivity growth may well
increase inequality, as a good deal of literature
suggests has happened in the United States in
the last two decades.
Heath has a more complicated process
in mind, however. If a taste for income redis-
tribution is income-elastic — that is, if peo-
ple want to share more as their incomes grow
— then increased productivity eventually will
lead to increased redistribution. But there is
at least some evidence to suggest that this is
exactly what has happened in Canada. Over
the last ﬁve decades, increases in the rate of
income redistribution in Canada have effec-
tively offset increases in inequality in “market
incomes,” with the effect that the post-tax and
-transfer distribution of income has remained
almost eerily constant. A dramatic illustration
of that is provided by a graph of the ratio of
the incomes of the top ﬁfth and bottom ﬁfth
of families as ranked by income (Statistics
Canada 1999). In terms of pre-tax and pre-
government-transfer income, the top ﬁfth
earns more than 20 times as much as the bot-
tom ﬁfth. In terms of post-tax and post-gov-
ernment-transfer income, however, the top
ﬁfth earns only a little more than ﬁve times as
much as the bottom ﬁfth. This difference
between what might loosely
2 be called “pre-
government” and “post-government” ratios is,
of course, the result of income redistribution.
While the post-tax and -transfer ratio has been
quite constant over time, the pre-government
ratio has ﬂuctuated considerably and in recent
years has risen (it was between 10 and 15 in
the early 1990s and rose almost to 25 in the
early 1990s). That the post-government ratio
nevertheless has not changed appreciably
means that the amount of income redistribu-
tion has in fact increased, as the hypothesis
Heath disputes would suggest. The only com-
plication in this story is that the evident
increase in redistribution has not coincided
with any great productivity boom.
3
Poverty
Inequality may or may not be a problem.
Poverty clearly is a problem. But if absolute
measures of poverty are used, there is simply
310
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dramatically reduced poverty in Canada and
throughout the Western world. As Nathan
Rosenberg and L.E. Birdzell, Jr., put it: “If we
take the long view of human history and judge
the economic lives of our ancestors by modern
standards, it is a story of almost unrelieved
wretchedness… Only during the last two hun-
dred years has there come to Western Europe,
the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan,
and a few other places one of history’s infre-
quent periods when progress and prosperity
have touched the lives of somewhat more than
the upper tenth of the population” (Rosenberg
and Birdzell 1986, 3). And even the favoured
upper decile often lived in conditions that
would be widely unacceptable today. A recent
biography of Queen Elizabeth I informs us that
one reason the royal household moved fre-
quently during the summer months was that
“the smells of a household occupied for several
days by many people, and of stables and court-
yards crowded with horses, could not be toler-
ated for long… There were no water closets in
any of the royal palaces until 1597 (Hibbert
1992, 130–131). Moving further forward in
time: my McGill colleague, economic histori-
an Mary Mackinnon, tells of how, during the
Great Depression, in some Canadian jurisdic-
tions welfare recipients could be cut off by the
authorities if they were discovered to have
indulged themselves in the luxury of owning
a toothbrush. In the 21st century, the debate
over what welfare recipients should be entitled
to involves such things as colour televisions and
personal computers. It is hard to imagine the
fury that would be unleashed on any politician
who dared suggest they should be deprived of
toothbrushes.
If, on the other hand, relative standards
of poverty are the metric of choice, then, in
the absence of any presumption that produc-
tivity improvements should disproportion-
ately increase the incomes of lower-income
workers, it shouldn’t surprise anyone that
productivity increases may not have reduced
poverty. If that is what people expected, they
were simply wrong to expect it.
Happiness
Whether higher productivity has led to
greater consumer satisfaction or, to use the
technical philosophical term, “happiness,” is a
more difficult question. At any given time,
income does seem to be associated with peo-
ple’s declared estimate of how happy they are.
On the other hand, through the decades there
apparently has been no persistent increase in
people’s characterization of their lives as
happy or not happy. Again, this may not be
surprising. Rosenberg and Birdzell’s observa-
tion on the possibility that societies can
“move from poverty to wealth without pro-
ducing a people serenely satisﬁed with itself”
is that “in fact it may be doubted that self-
satisﬁed people could move from poverty to
wealth in the ﬁrst place” (1986, 5). Another
possibility, favoured by Heath, is that happi-
ness is a relative thing and that humans, in
their characteristically misanthropic way (my
judgement, not his), feel best off when they
are doing better then their fellows.
Of course, if rankings really are what
counts, it might seem that we could all save
ourselves a good deal of trouble by agreeing to
strive less. If everyone did cut back on striving
by, say, 10 percent, then happiness rankings
would be preserved and absolute happiness lev-
els would be higher, since striving presumably
consumes energy. (If striving is itself satisfying
in some way that does not show up in stan-
dard audits of happiness, then the policy
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problem with this policy strategy, however, is
that laws to reduce unproductive striving are
unlikely to preserve rankings. The analogy is
often used of a crowd at a football game. If every-
one stands up, it is argued, everyone expends
more energy but no one sees any better. We
would be better off if we all sat down. To
someone such as myself, who is six foot six
inches tall, that argument has never made
sense. My height is in my legs. If everyone
stands up, I see much better. If a regulation is
passed requiring everyone to sit down, I will
be relatively disadvantaged; the ranking will
not be preserved. On balance, the law may
increase aggregate welfare (everyone will sit)
but it will also redistribute welfare (the tall
will see less well than formerly).
There is also the problem that regulation
forcibly restricts people’s choices. Although a
majority may feel the restriction is justiﬁed, a
substantial minority may not. Applying the
Pareto principle, which is so beautifully elab-
orated in Heath’s book, the majority might be
able to compensate the minority. (In this case
the grounds for compensation — how long a
person’s legs were — would not be easily sub-
ject to dissimulation.) But in practice com-
pensation is seldom paid, and there is therefore
good reason for the potential victims of any
such regulation to resist it.
Heath’s discussion of the contemporary
addiction to consumption does have the ring
of truth — though as applied to other people,
of course, never oneself. Addiction is proba-
bly always harmful, but at least many of the
good things in life — books, travel, music,
restaurant meals, abundant insurance, hyper-
fast computers, single-malt Scotch, to enu-
merate the standard professorial compulsions
— are not generally “positional goods,” and
can therefore be enjoyed by increasing num-
bers of people as productivity increases.
Beyond that there is the question of whether
addictions are best overcome by state action.
Will anti-consumption laws — or anti-work
laws, as in France — do a better job of chang-
ing behaviour than other means by which
mores change, as they clearly do from era to
era? Governments do not have a sterling
record when it comes to discouraging addic-
tion. As is often observed, they are themselves
addicted to gambling revenues.
Leisure
Finally, there is the question of leisure.
In the immediate post-war years, it probably
was expected that increasing affluence would
lead people to consume more leisure. That
this has not happened, however, does not
necessarily mean the impressive productivi-
ty improvements that have occurred since
then either were for naught or should be
reversed. It may simply be that people’s pref-
erences turned out to be different from what
they had thought they would be. Or other
things may have occurred that frustrated
their desire to consume more leisure — steep
increases in taxes, for instance. It is also true
that rising affluence has increased the price
of “positional goods,” such as desirably locat-
ed houses, with the result that the beneﬁts of
productivity increases have been transferred
from those who have brought about the pro-
ductivity gains to the original owners of such
assets. (Baby boomers who have seen their
parents sell the family home for many times
what they paid for it in real terms will under-
stand this argument well.) If some way could
be found to limit the transfer, then such
assets could be purchased at a lower cost in
time and effort, though also at a lower gain
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about productivity, however, as about pro-
duction. If the goal is to limit incomes to a
certain level, that level can be achieved with
less effort if productivity is higher.
PRIVATE AFFLUENCE, PUBLIC
SQUALOR?
The other major part of Heath’s cri-
tique of our normal assumptions about pro-
ductivity is the Galbraithian one that the
public sector is stunted. Or at least, to put a
contemporary spin on Galbraith, that the
dramatic late-20th-century growth in the
size of the public sector — its remarkable de-
stunting in most jurisdictions since 1958,
when The Affluent Society appeared — has
been entirely justiﬁed, and in fact was and is
“efficient” in the economist’s sense of that
word (Galbraith 1958).
In the deﬁnition of productivity pro-
vided above, the economist’s generic term
output was used. But surely it matters what
the output in question is. If productivity
increases serve merely to increase the size and
garishness of automobile tail ﬁns, as seemed
to be the case when The Affluent Society was
written, not just philosophers will wonder
whether the effort has been worth it.
Two qualiﬁcations are necessary here,
however. The ﬁrst is de gustibus non disputandum.
There may be greater willingness these days
than 20 years ago to hold to absolute standards
of taste — and indeed Galbraith himself was
perfectly happy to look down his (very long)
nose at some people’s preferences. But elite
opinion is still careful in dismissing the pleas-
ure other people derive from what may seem
to be bizarre consumption choices. Heath is
aware of and accepts this point. As he writes in
The Efficient Society, “Bad taste is not a crime,
nor should it be. We can use the critique of
consumerism as grounds to harangue our fel-
low citizens and try to get them to improve
their consumption choices, but we cannot use
it as a basis for public policy. The problem,
ultimately, is that the standard critique of con-
sumerism is a disguised form of perfectionism”
— by which he means “the idea that the pur-
pose of political association is to achieve ‘the
perfection of man’,” and to organize “all of
society to assist individuals in the pursuit of
[the]…ideal of the best human life” (Heath
2001, 254, 28). We generally don’t do that
any more. Within limits, we let people make
their own consumption choices for themselves.
Even in a purely Galbraithian perspec-
tive, however, productivity improvements may
be useful. If productivity increases mean that
any given number of tail ﬁns of a standard size
and vulgarity can be produced with less effort,
then that presumably is a gain to society. At
least in principle, the resources freed up by the
productivity gains could be put to “better” use,
even if in practice there is the danger that tail-
ﬁn designers will move on to making video
games or body jewellery, with no resulting bet-
terment and possibly a depreciation in the
human condition as a result.
Although Heath parts company with
Galbraith on perfectionism, his key policy rec-
ommendation is decidedly Galbraithian. But
it derives from the more mainstream eco-
nomic view that because markets fail many
public expenditures are likely to be efficient.
(Hence the title of his book.) That is certain-
ly true for goods that suffer from the tradi-
tional market failures of externalities or
“publicness,” and few economists will disagree
with this possibility. But Heath goes on to
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ure causes consumers of private goods to play
negative-sum games with one another.
“Prisoners’ dilemmas” and other forms of “col-
lective action problem” are, he believes,
endemic in modern society. For example,
drivers persist in passing one another on the
road even though both logic and empirics
suggest that traffic moves more quickly when
people stay in their own lanes. Or, still on the
subject of driving, in a world in which no one
drives a sport utility vehicle, buying an SUV
will improve the purchaser’s chances of sur-
viving a highway collision; but if everyone
drives an SUV, no one’s chances are improved.
Or, to switch to professional sports, the ﬁrst
user of steroids may obtain a signiﬁcant com-
petitive advantage, but once steroid use is
widespread users no longer achieve any com-
petitive advantage and yet still suffer the dan-
gerous side-effects of steroids.
If market failure of this sort is endemic,
then, Heath argues, corrective government
intervention may also have to be endemic. To
my mind, this ignores two serious difficulties.
The ﬁrst is that although game theory of the
sort Heath exploits so adeptly may well result
in a longer list of potential market failures, it
also introduces a whole new category of poten-
tial government failures. The “tragedy of the
House of Commons,” to use a phrase coined
by Ken McKenzie of the University of Calgary
(McKenzie 2001), is that politicians will
spend much of their time in prisoner’s dilem-
mas from which they cannot escape, and they
will do so in contexts that can lead to wide-
spread inefficiency. For example, in the spring
of 2002 a sitting prime minister argued,
apparently seriously, that one of the key func-
tions of a Member of Parliament is to help the
people of his riding get as large a share of
public muniﬁcence as possible. If MPs do take
that attitude, it is hard to imagine that pub-
lic spending and taxation will come to rest at
levels that could by any stretch of the imagi-
nation be considered optimal.
Mention of taxation raises the other great
difficulty with further increases in public expen-
diture: their cost. Estimates of the marginal cost
of public funds are controversial and, as usual in
such exercises, depend on the assumptions that
are made. But a good bet is that this cost is sub-
stantial and has grown. In 1961, three years after
The Affluent Society appeared, overall government
receipts were 27.8 percent of GDP. In 2000 they
were 44.3 percent of GDP (Finance Canada 2001,
Table 53). A fundamental theorem of public
ﬁnance is that the efficiency cost of the tax rises
with the square of the tax rate. It seems all but
certain, therefore, that the marginal cost of taxa-
tion is higher now, possibly substantially higher,
than it was then. Investments in public activity
that were efficient then may well not be efficient
now. Canadians who feel they are somehow less
selﬂess than their parents were should not get
down on themselves: the social cost of selﬂessness
was lower when their parents were young.
But leave aside this large political ques-
tion of how big the government should be.
Once the allocation problem has been dealt
with — once “the Heath problem” has been
overcome and we can be reasonably sure that all
the different goods on the extensive menu of
consumption available in a modern society are
being produced in their “right” amounts —
then the virtues of productivity improvements,
of “more with less,” become apparent again,
subject to the provisos already stressed about
the need not to spend more improving produc-
tivity than is available from the productivity
improvement. If, for example, Canadians have
made clear that they want more health care, and
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the health-care sector that cost less than they
are worth, then it is hard to see how undertak-
ing them would not be socially beneﬁcial.
Whether health care and education are ﬁnanced
publicly in Canada because, as Heath argues,
doing so is efficient, or because, as the opinion
polls suggest, most people worry that with pri-
vate ﬁnance poor Canadians would receive less
of these goods than the rest of us, once it has
been decided to ﬁnance such things in the pub-
lic sector, productivity improvements will
make more of these services available with less
sacriﬁce in terms of other goods and services.
The same is true in the private sector, once its
appropriate size has been determined. It is
therefore hard to understand how getting more
“stuff” for a given effort would be wasteful —
even if it is true that more of anything can be
harmful if the margin is extended far enough.
SOCIAL POLICY AND PRODUCTIVITY
So, ﬁnally, how does social policy come
into play in a discussion of productivity? Social
policy can be deﬁned in many ways, but for
present purposes suppose it comprises public
policies in health, education and welfare. Some
such policies are probably good for productiv-
ity, as the Left has been arguing, often with
urgency born of desperation, since the collapse
of communism put it on the intellectual and
for a time political defensive in the early 1990s.
Educated workers may be more productive
workers; education is at least publicly ﬁnanced
and in some cases even publicly produced; ergo
government can be good for productivity —
though it does not follow that the next dollar
spent on education will be good for productiv-
ity, or anything else for that matter.
The same argument is often made about
health care: unhealthy workers may well be
unproductive workers, though such a truism
is not by itself sufficient to justify increased
expenditures on health care.
But if some social policies increase pro-
ductivity, other social policies probably reduce
it, as the Right has argued, with increasing
persuasiveness from the middle of the 20th
century on as the state has grown, apparently
without limit. If you pay people to be unem-
ployed, and pay them year after year, as
Canada’s unemployment insurance program
does, they are more likely to be unemployed
and less likely to make investments in them-
selves. If you pay people to stay in regions of
the country where their productivity is low, or
grows only slowly, then pursuing such a poli-
cy has a cost in reduced productivity. If higher
and higher taxes create bigger and bigger “tax
wedges” (the difference between what the buy-
ers and the sellers in a transaction receive), then
the consequent discouragement to effort and
investment may deter productivity improve-
ments that without the tax wedges would have
produced beneﬁts greater than costs. If you
provide people with all they need in essential
goods and services such as education and health
care, then the income they derive from their
own efforts can be spent only on frivolous
things such as tail ﬁns and video games.
4
EFFICIENT SOCIAL POLICY
The policy strategy described above —
to search the economy for market failures
that need to be corrected and to undertake
the bigger-payoff investments ﬁrst — is
generally the strategy adopted by the con-
tributors to this volume (which is not
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are concerned, at least implicitly, with using
correlation analysis of one kind or another to
determine whether the particular social poli-
cies they are interested in tend to encourage
productivity growth. Once these “drivers” of
growth are discovered — be they health
care, education, day care, on-the-job train-
ing or any other aspect of social policy — it
presumably follows that they should be sub-
sidized. To inject Churchillian construction
into the jargon of welfare economics: “Give
us the triangles and we will ﬁnish the job.”
As I saw it, my role as a contributor to
this volume, one I was happy to play, was to
stress just how difficult a job it is to decide
what resources to put where. This theme was
ﬁrst developed by Hayek (1945) in his famous
essay “The Use of Knowledge in Society.”
Societies are extremely complex phenomena,
and it is very difficult for any agent or set of
agents to develop an understanding of their
complexity sufficient to allow successful
manipulation of the various “policy levers” in
such a way as to achieve desired social out-
comes. (Indeed, as the quotation marks are
meant to indicate, the term is itself a consid-
erable conceit.) A number of difficulties arise,
both conceptual and practical.
To begin with, it is not certain that past
drivers will be future drivers. Thanks to the
work of Vaillancourt, Finnie and others, we
have a rough approximation of what the pri-
vate and (by one deﬁnition, at least) the pub-
lic returns to various Canadian university
degrees were in the mid-1990s, by level of
education and in some cases even by discipline
(Vaillancourt and Bourdeau-Primeau 2002;
Finnie 2000). But is anyone really conﬁdent
that these rates of return will be the same ﬁve
or 10 years from now, when any new monies
that we decided to devote to education today
would start to produce graduates? In a recent
note, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(2001, 1) pointed out that in the latest US
recession unemployment rates rose more
quickly for highly skilled workers than for
less-skilled and unskilled workers — a rever-
sal of the experience of the early 1990s. In
some of his writings, Paul Krugman has
argued, in a similar vein, that professions like
lawyering and doctoring may experience
declining demand as new technologies take
over routine tasks in their ﬁelds. As with
mutual funds, so may it be with education:
past returns are no guarantee of future prof-
itability. Beyond that, there is the problem
that most calculations of the rate of return on
education do not even attempt to estimate the
size of the externalities that constitute a large
part of the potential gain in the minds of those
who favour increased public spending on
schooling. As a result, anyone who had the job
of allocating monies across disciplines — or
even across levels of education — in an
attempt to maximize the social return would
have little more than hunch and anecdote to
go on.
A second general difficulty, as already
suggested, is government failure. Assume for
a moment we are agreed, and we may not be,
that social policies should aim at making the
greatest possible contribution to productivi-
ty. The best way to do this would be to send
out battalions of economists to make their best
guesstimates of where marginal dollars will
pay off most. But of course the age of econo-
mist-kings is some way off yet (even if the fed-
eral Leader of the Opposition holds a master’s
degree in the discipline). Other considerations
are likely to intrude and, once the “policy
process” has acted itself out in full, money may
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teria at least, it would do the most good.
There is also the need for policy-mak-
ers to be sure they are not simply duplicat-
ing private efforts. Ministers of industry at
all levels of Canadian government set great
store by the high-tech revolution and in most
cases are eager both to be associated with it
and to encourage it — sometimes, it seems,
the former more than the latter. But does
anyone seriously believe that investment in
high technology was underfunded in the
1990s?
A further difficulty is that subsidies
have to be precise. As suggested above, too
much of a good thing can be bad. Externalities
can be over-corrected. It is at least conceivable
that at some point we will spend too much on
education (however heretical that may sound
coming from a university professor). Reading
some of the ﬁnal exams and papers submit-
ted in my courses suggests that maybe we
already do: many people currently in univer-
sity pretty clearly should not be there. Or
perhaps this anecdotal evidence suggests
instead that we need greater investment at
the pre-university level.
Finally, it is always important for pol-
icy-makers to keep in mind that the funds
they are using are expensive, and increasing-
ly so as rates of taxation rise. I do understand
that some taxes may now ﬁnally be falling —
slightly — but the recent declines are not yet
enough to establish a trend. Public revenues
remain at record ratios of GDP.
WHAT DO WE KNOW?
The greatest difficulty with the “sub-
sidize the drivers” strategy, however, is that
we simply do not know anything very pre-
cise about what the drivers are. The correla-
tions that are the stock-in-trade of this kind
of analysis simply are not very conclusive. To
quote from Richard Harris’s paper in this
volume (282): “...strong policy conclusions
are well ahead of both theory and evidence.
Neither provides conclusive support for the
proposition that either (a) policies directed at
reducing inequality will increase productiv-
ity growth, or (b) increased social spending
will raise productivity growth.” In this
inconclusive conclusion he echoes Jonathan
Temple’s survey in the Journal of Economic
Literature: “Even the most enthusiastic pro-
ponent of cross-country regressions must
acknowledge that we are a daunting distance
from the ultimate goal, a model with high
explanatory power which indicates with pre-
cision the relative contributions of different
inﬂuences” (Temple 1999, 148).
One reason why it is difficult to make
strong conclusions on the basis of statistical
correlations is that the explanatory variable
“social policy” is very hard to pin down. In two
recent papers, the OECD’s Willem Adema
shows how the scale of a country’s social poli-
cies varies according to its use of different
mechanisms for delivering such policies —
whether they be direct spending through the
public sector, tax expenditures or mandated
private expenditures. Thus, for instance, in
1997 gross Canadian public expenditure on
social policy was 20.7 percent of GDP at fac-
tor cost, compared to just 15.8 percent in the
United States. But in the same year, what
Adema calls “net total social expenditure,”
which includes spending, tax expenditures
and mandated private expenditures, was 21.8
percent in Canada and fully 23.4 percent in the
United States. The two countries’ rankings
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2001, Table A2.1).
5
WHAT DO WE DO?
In his contribution to this volume,
Richard Harris observes that “[o]ften in eco-
nomics, in the absence of decisive evidence for
or against a hypothesis, economic theory plays
an important role in determining the priors of
economists both as social scientists and as pol-
icy advisers” (297). Unfortunately, as he also
concludes, in the case of the effects of social
policy on productivity growth, theory often
provides ambiguous predictions. He might
have added that ideology will also have a con-
tinuing inﬂuence on the Canadian policy
debate, and ideology, whether of left, right or
centre, never provides ambiguous predictions.
In the absence of clear indicators of the
likely social return on the next dollar invested in
various areas of social policy, what is to be done?
One suggestion is that economists keep
correlating. Temple does note a growing view
that “regression fatigue” is beginning to set in,
“so that hearts sink when yet another dubious
growth regression is presented” (1999, 148).
But in fact the ﬁeld is relatively new, the data
keep accumulating, computers are becoming
ever more powerful, and theoretical work on
the determinants of growth continues apace, so
it is best for the profession to keep at it, even
if the likelihood that clear policy directives will
emerge from the effort does seem small. The
question of why some countries grow and oth-
ers don’t, which is in a sense the founding
question of modern economics, remains com-
pelling even if the answer remains elusive.
And of course, clear directions from
economists or not, policy will have to contin-
ue to be made. By all measures, most devel-
oped countries have a large chunk of their
GDP caught up in one form or another of
social policy. Within this very large expendi-
ture envelope, allocation decisions have to be
made — and doubtless will continue to be
made even if all the growth correlations econ-
omists calculate turn out to be statistically
insigniﬁcant or, for that matter, negative.
There are a number of reasons for this: redis-
tribution is important; economic optimality
does not always (or perhaps even ever) govern
policy; and, try as we might, conservatives
will never block all public spending (suppos-
ing that is what we wanted to do).
If there will be spending on education,
health care and welfare, the policy problem
then reduces to where we should increase
spending and where we should decrease it.
This is probably best done at the margin, in
the small, program by program. The funda-
mental question, as always, is where would you
get the biggest payoff, the biggest efficiency
bang for the buck, from an extra dollar of
spending. Should you provide further tax help
for investments in machinery and equipment?
Should you boost subsidies to R&D? Should
you put more money into higher education?
Into high schools? Into health care? Which
parts of health care? I’m afraid that on the basis
of what I heard at the authors’ workshop and
have since read in the papers prepared for this
volume I don’t really see much guidance for
beleaguered policy-makers.
We do all have our hunches about
where the payoffs would be greatest. In terms
of health care, an Ispos-Reid poll released in
January found that given a choice between
making people more personally responsible
for the services they use and cleaning up the
mismanagement in the system, 63 percent
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said people should be made more personally
responsible.
6 That is an interesting tradeoff
to read about, but it may not be a policy-rel-
evant tradeoff: cleaning up the mismanage-
ment of the system may not provide savings
sufficient to achieve the efficiencies people
want. The official political line from most
governments seems to be that money is not
the problem, that what the system needs is
reorganization. Economists, who consider
that more money will help most problems of
perceived shortages, ﬁnd this a strange argu-
ment, but the “Gorbachev strategy” of
reforming the system rather than starting
over from scratch seems to be politically
saleable. My own view is that we badly need
competition within the system. The two
places where Canadians feel most abused
these days are in hospital waiting rooms and
Air Canada departure lounges.
As for education, the question again is:
where are the rates of return likely to be high-
est? Current public policy, particularly at the
federal level, seems to put the greatest empha-
sis on post-secondary education. On the other
hand, François Vaillancourt’s work seems to
suggest the pecuniary returns, both public and
private, are greatest at lower levels of educa-
tion. Those who do worst in this society very
likely are not unemployed university gradu-
ates. They probably are high-school dropouts
who lack basic literacy and numeracy. Of
course, it does not follow that the marginal
return now would be as high as the average
return in the mid-1990s, which is the latest era
for which we have estimates. Nor do existing
studies have much to say about the size of the
externalities from different types of education.
As Jeffrey Smith cautions in a recent C.D.
Howe Institute book, “While it is handy for
those of us who make our living in the higher
education sector to point to the shimmering
hope of externalities to justify our funding, the
taxpayer would be better served with some
hard empirical estimates” (Smith 2002, 278).
At the margin, I suspect the ﬁnancial con-
straints are more severe for those who wish to
borrow in order to complete high school than
for those who wish to ﬁnance university edu-
cation. We who have children in the education
system, even in Quebec’s education system,
which was highly praised at the authors’ work-
shop, would also wish to introduce more com-
petition and incentives to good performance.
Regarding welfare, the consensus in the
policy establishment seems to support the
OECD’s preference for active labour market
policies. I wonder, though, whether there are
not cases in which cash payments are admissi-
ble. Since the Clinton reform of welfare, United
States policy in effect insists that the mothers
of young children go out into the workforce and
ﬁnd gainful employment. The rationale for this
must be that work habits are subject to “hys-
teresis” — that they are self-reinforcing. In this
regard, the disappointing long-term effects of
the policy measures tried in the Self-Sufficiency
Project (SSP) — when subsidies to work were
removed participants in the project had essen-
tially the same work patterns as the control
group — suggest that the long-term cost of
allowing women to take time off to care for
their young children may not have permanent-
ly debilitating effects on their employability.
7
That welfare policies can have harmful
effects on productivity in other ways is illus-
trated by the case of Fishery Products
International, which in the winter of 2001-02
attempted to rearrange its production meth-
ods in Newfoundland so as to provide year-
round employment for a substantially smaller
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on a part-time basis. Although the total
amount paid out in wages would not have
changed, and the company’s productivity
would have increased substantially, fewer peo-
ple would have been eligible for Employment
Insurance premiums. The widespread public
opposition to this proposal may have had more
to do with the perception that it constituted
a double-cross on FPI’s part. But whether that
is true or not, the company quickly withdrew
the proposal, with the effect that its produc-
tivity level will remain subject to customary,
not accelerated, growth rates. Applying
Heathian principles to this case, preserving the
status quo may for the time being create
greater aggregate happiness in Newfoundland
than the ﬁrm’s proposal would have done, but
it is hard to see how what seems bound to be
declining competitiveness on this ﬁrm’s part
will help Newfoundland in the long run.
The discussion of this paper at the
authors’ workshop wound down in an
exchange over how much we really know
about the effects of various social policies.
One or two people better acquainted with
the relevant literature than I argued that in
fact we know a good deal. I’m less optimistic.
It seems to me we have very little idea of the
likely payoffs to different types of investment
in the area of social policy, which means pol-
icy is likely to be determined by politics and
by whatever the common sense of the day
suggests. That is a sad commentary on eco-
nomics. I fear it may also lead to sad policy
outcomes.
NOTES
1 The contribution by Frank Graves and Richard Jenkins
to this volume generally suggests greater familiarity
with productivity issues on the part of Canadians,
though it does not ask the straightforward question
about Canadians’ understanding of the concept of
productivity in the way that Marzolini did. They, too,
conclude that poll results caused the government to re-
cast its productivity agenda as an innovation agenda.
2 Only loosely, however: it does not include transfers
in kind.
3 The Statistics Canada chart referred to goes only as
far as 1997.
4 The disturbing moral implications of such a
situation are described in Acton (1993).
5 Note that the fact that the United States moves from
virtually last on the list of OECD countries to ﬁrst
may actually improve the correlation between social
policy and productivity, since US growth rates have
been so strong in recent years.
6 See Mickleburgh (2002).
7 Conceived and funded by Human Resources
Development Canada (HRDC), SSP is a research and
demonstration project to test a policy innovation
that makes work pay better than welfare. The Self-
Sufficiency Project was designed as a social
experiment using a rigorous random-assignment
research model. In the main SSP study, a group of
5,688 single parents (primarily single mothers) in
New Brunswick and the lower mainland of British
Columbia who had been on Income Assistance (IA)
for at least a year were selected at random from the
IA rolls with one-half assigned to the program group
which received the SSP supplement while the
remainder formed a control group.
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